

Message Text

PAGE 01 RANGOO 00002 090350Z

15 L
ACTION EA-10

INFO OCT-01 NEA-09 ISO-00 PM-03 NSC-05 SP-02 SS-15 CIAE-00

INR-07 NSAE-00 IO-10 PRS-01 L-02 DODE-00 /065 W
----- 073455

R 090200Z MAY 75
FM AMEMBASSY RANGOON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9552
INFO AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE
AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR
AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
AMEMBASSY DACCA
AMEMBASSY MANILA
AMCONSUL HONG KONG
USLO PEKING
CINCPAC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 RANGOON 1189

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

7. GUB CAN, AS IT APPEARS TO RECOGNIZE, TAKE TIME TO WAIT AND SEE WHAT DEVELOPMENTS OCCUR IN INDOCHINA AND WHAT IMPLICATIONS THESE HAVE FOR ITS SECURITY. (WORKING LEVEL OF FOREIGN MINISTRY IS ALREADY THINKING ABOUT SUCH TOPICS.) IN LONGER RUN, OF COURSE, GUB POLICY MAY CHANGE GRADUALLY AS RESULT OF BOTH RECENT AND FUTURE EVENTS IN INDOCHINA. AN OBVIOUS POSSIBILITY WOULD BE DEVELOPMENT OF A CLOSER RELATIONSHIP WITH ASEAN COUNTRIES, ESPECIALLY THAILAND. BURMESE RECOGNIZE THAT THAI EXPOSURE TO EXTERNAL PRESSURE HAS INCREASED IMPORTANTLY, AND THAT THAI SECURITY IS CLOSELY RELATED TO BURMA'S. THIS COULD ENCOURAGE INCREASED COOPERATION; MORE IMPORTANTLY, ADOPTION BY RTG OF A MORE NEUTRALIST FOREIGN POLICY, AND WITHDRAWAL OF U.S. FORCES FROM THAILAND, WOULD PROVIDE SOME OF THE CONDITIONS FOR SUCH A CLOSER RELATIONSHIP. ON THE OTHER HAND, PROBLEM OF BURMESE INSURGENTS BASED IN THAILAND REMAINS, AND THE INCREASED THAI EXPOSURE MAY MERELY HEIGHTEN BURMESE RELUCTANCE TO
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 RANGOO 00002 090350Z

BECOME INVOLVED IN OTHER PEOPLE'S PROBLEMS.

8. A SPECIAL PROBLEM FOR BURMA AS FOR OTHER SEA COUNTRIES, AND ONE WHICH BURMESE ARMED FORCES ARE AWARE OF, IS THE DISPOSITION OF THE

MASS OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT IN INDOCHINA. THIS HAS LONG BEEN THE SOURCE OF MOST SUPPLIES FOR THE 25 OR SO DIFFERENT INSURGENT GROUPS OPERATING IN BURMA, AND THEIR OPERATIONS WILL BECOME EASIER IF NOT NECESSARILY MORE EFFECTIVE AS THEIR EQUIPMENT BECOMES MORE PLENTIFUL AND CHEAPER. THERE IS, HOWEVER, LITTLE GUB CAN DO ABOUT PROBLEM EXCEPT TO HOPE THAT PRG AND GRUNK ARE ABLE TO EXERCISE TIGHTER CONTROLS OVER SURPLUS EQUIPMENT THAN THEIR PREDECESSOR GOVERNMENTS.

9. IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. INTERESTS. ON THE BASIS OF BURMESE REACTIONS SO FAR, WE CAN DISCERN NO MAJOR DAMAGE TO U.S. INTERESTS IN BURMA, OR REQUIREMENT FOR ADJUSTMENTS IN OUR POLICIES HERE. WHILE THE MINORITY OF BURMESE WHO ONCE THOUGHT GUB MIGHT GET HELP FROM THE U.S. IF WORST CAME TO WORST (PARA 5 ABOVE) HAS BEEN DISILLUSIONED, THE PRACTICAL CONSEQUENCE OF THEIR DISILLUSIONMENT IS NEGLIGIBLE BECAUSE OF THE ABSENCE OF ANY U.S. MILITARY OR SECURITY COMMITMENT IN BURMA, AND THE CONSISTENT EMPHASIS IN OUR POLICY ON NON-INTERFERENCE AND RESPECT FOR BURMESE NEUTRALITY. OUR MODEST ECONOMIC/COMMERCIAL INTERESTS REVOLVE MAINLY AROUND OBTAINING ACCESS ON MOST-FAVORED-NATION TERMS TO BURMESE NATURAL RESOURCES. COLLAPSE OF GKR AND GVN WILL PROVIDE ANOTHER TALKING POINT FOR THOSE ELEMENTS IN GUB WHICH HAVE ALL ALONG VIEWED FOREIGN INVESTMENT OR PARTICIPATION AS HAVING DANGEROUS POLITICAL OVERTONES (PARA 2 ABOVE), BUT THE NEW TALKING POINT WILL HAVE NO DECISIVE IMPACT, SO ULTIMATE OUTCOME OF DEBATE WILL CONTINUE TO DEPEND MAINLY ON INTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS, AND -- IMPORTANTLY -- ON GUB EXPERIENCE WITH CURRENT OFFSHORE OIL INVESTMENTS. WE SEE NO REASON FOR GUB COMMITMENT TO NARCOTICS CONTROL, ANOTHER MAJOR U.S. INTEREST IN BURMA, TO LESSEN AS RESULT OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS, THOUGH CONTROL CAPABILITIES MAY BE FURTHER LESSENER BY SUCH PROSPECTIVE EVENTS AS INCREASED FLOW OF ARMS AND AMMUNITION TO INSURGENT/TRAFFICKERS (PARA 8 ABOVE). IT FOLLOWS THAT IN BURMA THE INDOCHINA DEVELOPMENTS DO NOT REQUIRE ANY NEW PROGRAMS OR MAJOR ADJUSTMENTS IN OUR POLICIES.

OSBORN

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 18 AUG 1999
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: n/a
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 09 MAY 1975
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: CunninFX
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1975RANGOO00002
Document Source: ADS
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: N/A
Errors: n/a
Film Number: n/a
From: RANGOON
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1975/newtext/t19750599/abbrznqu.tel
Line Count: 92
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE
Office: n/a
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 2
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: CunninFX
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 07 JUL 2003
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <07 JUL 2003 by KelleyW0>; APPROVED <13 NOV 2003 by CunninFX>
Review Markings:

Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
05 JUL 2006

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: n/a
TAGS: n/a
To: STATE INFO BANGKOK
VIENTIANE
KUALA LUMPUR
JAKARTA
SINGAPORE
NEW DELHI

DACCA
MANILA
HONG KONG
PEKING
CINCPAC
Type: TE

Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 05 JUL 2006